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1 This book bears witness to the wide range of topics of philosophical interest in which
classical as well as contemporary pragmatist philosophers are involved, or to which
they have made durable contributions, or simply on which they have an original word
to say. Reading the headings of the six parts that make up this volume – Democracy,
Normativity, Religion, Action and Habit, Inquiry, and Ontology and Meaning – one has
the feeling that no other philosophical movement of the present can afford to provide
distinctive,  if  plural  perspectives  on  such  a  variety  of  discussions  as  this  book
encompasses; a feeling that gets even deeper when one considers that the list of topics
could have been made longer easily by including sections such as on pragmatist ethics,
education, philosophy of law, or aesthetics.
2 The three essays collected under the heading “Democracy,” by Mats Bergman, Torjus
Midtgarden, and Jón Ólafsson hinge mainly on John Dewey, as everyone would expect.
Now,  Midtgarden  and  Ólafsson  evade the  usual  approaches  that  insist  on  the
unconventional,  not  ‘narrowly  political’  sense  of  Dewey’s  talk  of  democracy,  and  –
assuming rightly that this is not a reason for dodging direct questions – they confront
Dewey  with  hot  topics  of  contemporary  political  theory  such  as  liberalism  versus
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communitarianism,  pluralism  versus  multiculturalism, or  activism  versus
institutionalism. As a prior question, the opening essay by Mats Bergman (“Minimal
Meliorism:  Finding  a  Balance  between  Conservative  and  Progressive  Pragmatism”)
accounts  for  the  traditional  association of  pragmatist  philosophy with  the  political
ideals  of  human  amelioration  and  social  reform.  While  this  association  has  good
grounds, it raises at least two difficulties. First, those ideals seem at odds with Charles
S. Peirce’s conception of philosophy as a non-utilitarian endeavour – i.e. as a purely
theoretical  activity disconnected of practical  concerns –,  a point that has led many
scholars  to  the  (all  too)  convenient  expedient  of  splitting  pragmatism  into  a
‘conservative’ and a ‘progressive’ wing. Second, it is not clear whether the reliance of
pragmatist  thinkers  on  experimental  methods  and  scientific  rationality  would  not
incline  their  reformism toward  a  regrettable  sort  of  social  engineering  that  favors
authoritarian  rather  than  truly  democratic  policies.  Bergman  provides  a  nuanced
discussion  of  (scientific,  societal,  metaphysical)  meliorism  and  points  to  a  balance
between “the  social-melioristic  and scientific-conservative  temperaments”  (25)  as  a
way to overcome the above difficulties and to preserve and improve the transformative
impulse of the pragmatic tradition as a whole. Torjus Midtgarden (“John Dewey and
Democratic  Participation  under  Modern Conditions”)  brings  some traits  of  Dewey’s
social  ontology  –  especially,  his  category  of  ‘the  public(s)’  –  to  the  fore  of  the
contemporary debate on the crisis of representative democracy. Dewey’s insistence on
communication and cooperation as the very essence of a democratic society is, though
inspired in the old Jeffersonian ideal of direct interactions among members of local
communities, still relevant to apprehend the present gap between civil society and the
institutional structure, where individuals fail to make their demands bear on politics
and  legislation.  Moreover,  the  new  era  of  communication  technology  may  open
unexpected  possibilities  to  realize  Dewey’s  idea  of  a  “cooperative  inquiry  through
cognitive  division of  labour” (39)  between lay  agents  and social  scientists,  as  some
recent social movements may illustrate. Jón Ólafsson (“Democracy and the Problem of
Pluralism:  John Dewey Revisited”)  poses  a  central  question in order to  assess  what
democracy is, or should be, according to different traditions in current political theory:
is democracy a “form of life” that commits individuals to a particular set of values, or is
it only a “procedural device” in order to deal with the diversity of value-options that
coexist in modern societies? Ólafsson argues cleverly that this dichotomy – ‘moral’ vs
‘political’ conceptions of democracy – reveals its limitations when applied to Dewey.
When  commentators  criticize  Deweyan  democracy  for  being  just  a  moral  doctrine
deprived  of  rational  cogency  (on  liberal  grounds)  within  pluralistic  societies,  they
overlook the epistemic component involved in Dewey’s approach – a component that
defies simplistic oppositions such as morality versus reasonableness, valuations versus
procedures, leading a meaningful life versus engaging in decision- and policy-making.
When this fundamental epistemic side of the democratic rationale is taken into account
the idea that Dewey’s theory does not fulfill the demands of public reason – i.e. that it
only commends itself on moral grounds – fails, for “the diversity of valuations broadens
the cognitive base of democratic choice and thus feed[s] into a liberal conception of
democracy, rather than a communitarian notion of the good” (52).
3 Part  II  is  devoted  to  questions  on  “Normativity.”  Henrik  Rydenfelt  (“Pragmatism,
Objectivity  and  Normative  Realism”)  and  Pentti  Määtänen  (“Naturalism  and
Normativity  in  Pragmatism”)  address  this  topic  as  it  is  discussed  in  two  different
theoretical contexts: the semantics of value judgments (usually called ‘meta-ethics’ by
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analytic  philosophers)  and philosophical  naturalism in its  connection to norms and
valuations,  respectively.  As  for  the  latter,  the  pragmatic  solution to  the  ‘fact-value
problem’ is presented as depending on a crucial shift that Peirce and Dewey made in
the way philosophers used to deal with it: instead of presuming that human beings are
mental  entities confronted to an external physical  reality – a picture that makes it
almost  impossible  to  conceive  values  as  something  more  than  subjective,  mental
responses to objective, physical facts –, they took the active organism interacting with
the environment as  the proper  ‘unit  of  analysis.’  Määtänen explains  how this  shift
helps introduce teleological features in nature and treat values as natural entities in a
sense that should not be controversial prima facie for naturalist philosophers. Then
Rydenfelt’s contribution could be read as the transposition of this very same point to
the  more  intricate  scenario  of  semantic  theory  (to  reverse  the  order  of  these  two
chapters would have been probably an editorial improvement). His defense of realism
concerning normative or moral judgments dispenses with representationalism – the
semantic counterpart of the mental/physical picture – and adopts Huw Price’s “global
expressivist  perspective.”  “Global”  means  here  that  normative  and  non-normative
claims are put on the same foothold, therefore such perspective does not amount to
anti-cognitivism  but  rather  to  a  re-description  of  cognitive  relations  that  gets  by
without  the  representational  picture.  Rydenfeldt’s  contention  is  that  although
expressivism usually  risks  collapse  into  a  historicist  form of  relativism of  the  sort
promoted by Richard Rorty, this can be avoided if we complement it with a Peircean
account  of  truth  as  the  aim of  inquiry –  an  account  that  preserves  realism (in  its
‘hypothetical’ variation)  without falling back into the representationalist  view.  This
move brings Peirce, by Rydenfeldt’s lights, closer to Robert Brandom’s assessment of
objectivity “as a normative standard of our assertoric practices rather than by (for the
most part) invoking traditional realist notions” (80).
4 The two contributions to Part III,  “Religion,” share the view that pragmatism’s best
service to this subject is to blaze a trail between traditionally irreconcilable positions
such  as  theism/atheism,  fideism/evidentialism,  spiritualism/rationalism,  and  so  on.
William James’s ascendency on this opinion is of course unquestionable, and both Ulf
Zackariasson (“A Skeptical Pragmatic Engagement with Skeptical Theism”) and Sami
Pihlström (“Objectivity in Pragmatist Philosophy of Religion”) draw heavily on him.
Zackariasson  focuses  on  a  well  delimited  topic,  namely  the  problem  of  evil as  a
persistent challenge to theology – and why a recent response to it, labelled ‘skeptical
theism,’ should be rejected by pragmatists – whilst Pihlström elaborates more fully on
the possibilities opened by pragmatist conceptions of belief, objectivity, rationality, or
inquiry (together with some recourse to modern theories of recognition) to unblock
entrenched disagreements  and favor  more  promising discussions  between believers
and non-believers. Both essays ably show the capacity of pragmatist ways of thinking to
combat  reductionisms,  and  in  the  specific  case  of  religious  belief  to  develop  a
sensitivity to its multiple human dimensions. Nonetheless, they also could be charged
with  a  reproach  that  reaches  back  to  James  himself,  namely  a  tendency  to
overemphasize the goods that religious beliefs bring to believers’ lives. Zackariasson,
for  instance,  invokes  Hume and Kant  in  support  of  the  pragmatist  persuasion that
religion cannot be treated as a strictly cognitive affair (141, 143). From this persuasion,
both  Kant  and  James  set  out  to  look  for  justification  of  religious  ideas  (God,
immortality) in the practical use of reason, i.e. in their role as necessary conditions for
a conscientious moral life. In James’s case the argument did not adopt a transcendental
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form,  of  course,  but  was  intended  to  rest  on  human  experience  only.  Hence  for
pragmatists  it  is  an  empirical  question  whether  religious  belief  fosters  or,  on  the
contrary,  impedes  human  flourishing,  the  latter  being  the  conclusion  that  Hume
himself obtained, and such empirical question deserves an examination more detailed
and  ‘polyphonic,’  so  to  say,  than  it  receives  here.  In  other  words,  the  pragmatic
justification  of  atheism  seems  at  least  as  viable  prima  facie  as  the  pragmatic
justification  of  theism  does,  and  this  quandary  cannot  be  solved  by  philosophical
argument only. A second difficulty in these efforts to overcome the theism/atheism-
debate  and  “to  see  religious  believers  and  atheists  as  fellow  inquirers”  –  as
Zackariasson puts it  following Pihlström – is  that they tend to underemphasize the
imperativeness that is peculiar to religious belief as such. This may not be so important
when “the paradigmatic responses transmitted via religious rites, symbols, myths and
stories  are  actually  very  similar  to  the  paradigmatic  responses  transmitted  in
analogous  ways  in  [many  very]  different  non-religious  ideologies  and  humanistic
outlooks” (127), but it becomes a major problem when it is not so – and note that it is
only when it is not so that the theism/atheism-debate has practical bearings. Again, the
objection can be traced back to William James, who seems to have considered religion
under an excessively benevolent light. As Ramón del Castillo observes in a recent study:
“Some believers would thank James for defending their right to partake in public life
without concealing their beliefs. An all too different thing is that they would be ready
to  obey  anything  but  the  will  of  their  respective  Gods.  James’s  [polytheistic]
experimentalism presupposes to some extent what it is intended to foster: tolerance.”1
5 The essays presented in Part IV (“Action and Habit”) are specially recommendable to
those who wrongly think that pragmatism’s main point is basically easy to grasp, and
accordingly easy to dismiss. ‘Action’ and ‘habit’ are recurrent expressions in pragmatist
literature,  but  they have misled critics  and even followers  who take  them in  their
customary  sense,  which  is  rooted  in  mind/body  dualism.  Erkki  Kilpinen’s  “Habit,
Action, and Knowledge from the Pragmatist Perspective” is an insightful exposition of
the  change  operated  by  classical  pragmatists  –  the  author  calls  it  “a  Copernican
revolution”  with  good  reason  –  in  the  traditional  understanding  of  habit  and  its
relation to action and intentionality. Here Määtänen’s above remarks on the new ‘unit
of analysis’  established  by  Peirce  and  Dewey  are  pertinent  once  more.  The
‘revolutionary’  view  is  nicely  condensed  by  Kilpinen  in  a  Kant-like  fashion
–“intentionality  without  habituality  is  empty,  habituality  without  intentionality  is
blind” (160)  –  and is  shown to  have received empirical  confirmation from ongoing
developments  in  cognitive-  and  brain-science.  After  the  pragmatist
reconceptualization, actions appear as secondary to habits – indeed, they exemplify
habits –,  where habits are not mindless routines but mind’s “vehicles of  cognition”
(160, a term borrowed from Määtänen). In a similar vein, Matz Hammarström (“On the
Concepts  of  Trans-action  and  Intra-action”)  insists  on  the  relational  character  of
human action in order to transcend the idea that the agent and what is acted upon are
separated, self-contained beings. Dewey used the term ‘trans-action’ to describe the
process  of  knowing  as  something  that  involves  the  full  situation  of  organism-
environment,  not  a  mere  inter-action  between  two  independent  entities,  say,  the
observer and the object observed. Hammerström makes this epistemological point into
an onto-epistemological one by appealing to Karen Barad’s sophisticated concept of
‘intra-action’,  originally  developed  in  the  philosophy  of  physics  to  deal  with  such
problems as the Bohr-Heisenberg debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
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Thus  both  Kilpinen’s  and Hammerström’s  papers  point  at  interesting  convergences
between  important  pragmatist  insights  and  empirical  science.  Frank  Martela’s
“Pragmatism as an Attitude” is written in a very different key. It builds on the idea that
pragmatism  is  not  primarily  a  theory  but  an  attitude  in  philosophy,  and  aims
consequently at identifying its actual content. Martela contends that this conception of
what pragmatism is was endorsed equally by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Schiller, but
this may be objectionable. For instance, it  is not clear that when Peirce and Dewey
speak of pragmatism as ‘a method’ they are conveying exactly the same idea as James
does when he speaks of “a temper of mind” (188, 192). Anyway, Martela’s description of
the ‘pragmatist attitude’ identifies central features (experimentalism, anti-absolutism,
fallibilism,  orientation  to  outcomes  and  consequences,  acknowledgement  of
contingency in experience and of our relation to the world as primarily practical and
oriented by human interests) that no one would deny to be typically pragmatist. To say
that “these beliefs are what we find at the beginning of the philosophical journey of a
pragmatist […] not the results of a rigorous philosophical inquiry” (197) is probably
right  in  many  cases.  From this  the  author  concludes  that  pragmatism  will  remain
unattractive to those who do not embrace the same beliefs. Now, not all pragmatists
will find this sort of psychologism convincing, for beliefs can be changed by experience
and reasoning and also  by philosophical  argument.  This  is  why Peirce  added,  after
acknowledging  the  humanistic  element  that  F. C. S. Schiller  associated  with
pragmatism, that he did not think “that the doctrine can be proved in that way” (198, n.
6).  Martela  creates  what  in  my view is  an  unnecessary  and unfair  divide  when he
writes:  “This more humane approach to philosophy may not be as exact,  analytic or
confident as the more idealized way of doing philosophy. But I  see it  to be a more
honest way of doing philosophy, and less an intellectual escape from the particularities
of human life” (204).
6 “Inquiry,” the topic dealt with in Part V, is arguably what pragmatism is all about in the
end. It was to gain a better understanding of our inquisitive activities as natural beings
in all kind of settings that classical pragmatists set out to revise traditional notions of
truth,  knowledge,  thinking,  and  so  on.  Accordingly,  pragmatism  is  not  so  much
concerned with epistemology than with logic, if we take logic in the Aristotelian sense
as the proper method of inquiring. In this connection, Peirce’s doubt-belief approach to
inquiry and Dewey’s treatment of reasoning as a problem-solving task are admittedly
the two milestones of pragmatist logic, and the essays in this section revolve around
them. Sami Paavola (“Deweyan Approaches to Abduction?”) and Lauri Järvilehto (“The
Role  of  Intuition  in  Inquiry”)  tackle  the  most  intriguing  stage  of  thought,  i.e.  the
process that leads from the statement of a problem to a hypothesis that would solve it.
It is intriguing because hypothesis formation is not governed by inductive or deductive
reasoning, and this seems to consign this crucial stage of inquiry to psychology rather
than  logic.  Paavola  compares  Peirce’s  concept  of  ‘abduction’  with  Dewey’s
characterization of ‘reflective thought’ on this point. Though the differences are clear –
Peirce is more interested in identifying the logical element in the process, whilst Dewey
takes it mostly as non-inferential and focuses on the dynamics of ‘working hypotheses’
–, similarities and continuities are significant: “The nature of abduction was a constant
question  for  Peirce,  and  his  formulations  of  abduction  were  often  close  to  many
‘psychological  processes’  like perception,  instinct,  guessing or insight.  On the other
hand, Dewey’s ideas about the role of hypotheses, suggestions, or ideas as a part of
processes of inquiry are quite close to Peirce’s” (246). Guesswork is precisely the subject
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of  Järvilehto’s  contribution.  Taking  advantage  of  pragmatism’s  commitment  to
naturalism, he bypasses the psychological/logical dichotomy and discusses the point in
terms of empirical studies of the human mind. Although the dichotomy may persist as a
conceptual  problem, its  philosophical  implications are somewhat defused when one
learns that some models of brain functioning – in this case, the dual-processing theory
of thought – afford viable explanations of how ‘intuitive’ and ‘discursive’ operations
coexist and interplay in one and the same brain/mind. Besides, Järvilehto’s piece is in
itself a nice illustration of the non-vicious circle of naturalism: it is only natural that we
can  use  our  minds  to  form  hypotheses  about  how  our  minds  manage  to  form
hypotheses  by  and large.  Margareta  Bertilsson,  for  her  part,  introduces  pragmatist
themes in her rich,  thoughtful  reflection on the theory of  explanation (“On Why’s,
How’s,  and  What’s  –  Why  What’s  Matter”). Ever  since  Peirce  remarked  that  even
perceptual  judgments  can rest  on abductive  inference,  that  is,  that  hypotheses  are
involved even in stating what is there as a matter of bare perception (hypotheses that
are extremely fallible,  by the way),  pragmatist philosophers have insisted that fact-
descriptions, far from being the starting point of inquiry and explanation, are integral
to it and, in a sense, they constitute its final result. Therefore, the traditional emphasis
on  why’s  and  how’s  as  the  key  questions  in  explanation,  scientific  or  within  daily
affairs, should be corrected: “Inquiry starts out with a bothering What irritating us, as
we do not quite know what is going on; but the end of inquiry might also be a more
informed What,  now in the form of  a  more ripe hypothesis  as  to  what  goes  on.  In
relation to the Why’s and the How’s, What’s appear to us as infinitely open-ended, as a
point of reference in which interlocutors in a dialogue help finding a common ground
of reference so as to secure further (inter)action” (216). Bertilsson reveals the special
benefits of this view to recurrent methodological debates in the philosophy of social
sciences, where “the eruptive division […] between structure and agency, constraints
and choice,  because-of  vs. in-order-to  motives”  (218)  creates  deep divisions  among
inquirers as to what social science events are and what counts as explanations of them.
(Again, I think that placing Bertilsson’s chapter at the end of this section, not at the
beginning, would have formed a better sequence.)
7 Answers  to  What’s  questions  are  the  domain  of  ontology,  thus  if  pragmatism  sees
What’s as infinitely open-ended, as Bertilsson puts it, then one can ask exactly in what
relation pragmatist philosophy stands to ontological theory. This problem is discussed
in  Part  VI  (“Ontology  and  Meaning”)  in  the  language-centered  manner  that  is
characteristic  of  analytic  philosophers,  and  of  analytically-oriented  pragmatist
philosophers – often called ‘neopragmatists’ – at that. The problem at hand could be
phrased as follows: if ontology – or, to use its other name, metaphysics – is an inquiry
into  what  really is,  most  generally  speaking  and  without  reference  to  particular
observations  that  are  always  conditioned  and,  at  best,  partial,  and  if  pragmatism
dismisses  absolute  views  and  unconditioned  truths  altogether,  then  should  not
pragmatists reject metaphysics as a whole? Bjørn Ramberg (“Method and Metaphysics:
Pragmatist Doubts”) reminds us, however, that “metaphysics belongs to metaphysics”
(275), i.e. that the impugnation of metaphysics is in itself a metaphysical statement, for
in  saying  what  metaphysics  is,  even  to  reject  it,  one  must  engage  the  blatantly
metaphysical  distinction  between  appearance  and  reality.  Now,  there  is  a  sort  of
ontological  theorizing,  Heikki  J.  Koskinen  suggests  in  “On  Quine’s  Pragmatic
Conception of Ontology,” that can do without essentialism and “global realism” (the
idea that ontology depicts the mind-independent structure of reality), this theorizing
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being perfectly within the limits  of  naturalism, empiricism, fallibilism, and rational
responsibility  that  pragmatism  imposes  on  us.  One  can  see  Ramberg’s  non-
metaphysical reading of Donald Davidson along these lines: Davidson’s attempt to find
out the large features of reality by studying the general structure of our language can
be co-opted by pragmatists “once [the ascent to explanatory generality] is decoupled
from the representationalist framework, from the idea that we are specifying features
of global out-looks, features that must be true of any such [global out-look]. There may
be, as Davidson acknowledges,  many lines of ascent to generality,  different ways of
specifying structure – what we must turn our backs on is the idea that they will take us
from what merely appears to us to be so to what is really real” (277). Once traditional
metaphysics is deprived of its representationalist (essentialist, absolutist) pretentions,
it loses all that makes the pragmatist stand against it and can be transformed, Ramberg
holds following Rorty, in a useful tool for ‘cultural politics,’ i.e. for freeing ourselves of
philosophical views that diminish “our active participation in, and thus our willingness
and ability to take responsibility for, any particular rendering of our relations to the
world, to each other, and to ourselves” (277) and replace them with more promising
views.  Davidson’s  final  picture  of  language  as  communicative  encounters  between
‘idiolects,’  where  no  shared,  global  view  of  things  is  required  and  meanings  are
somehow  negotiated  among  participants,  would  be  one  of  those  views  (note  the
parallelism with what Bertilsson says about “finding a common ground of reference so
as to secure further (inter)action.” This picture, however, is questioned by Jonathan
Knowles in “Davidson versus Chomsky: The Case of Shared Languages.” Knowles argues
that Davidson fails to prove that his semantics escape the commitment to irreducibly
shared  meaning.  This  would  show  that  “there  must  be  something  wrong  with
Davidson’s  overall  or  ‘ideological’  approach to  language  and communication,  and –
assuming that the more general objections to shared languages proffered by Chomsky,
and which I take Davidson would endorse, are essentially correct – that there is reason
to think that Chomsky’s overall view instead is on the right track” (304). This debate, I
would say,  involves a wider confrontation between two different understandings of
what is at issue in the idea of naturalizing not only language but philosophy in general,
an  idea  that  is  central  to  pragmatism.  Chomsky’s  overall  or  ideological  view  sees
language as “a specific neural capacity of human beings that manifests itself in our
behavior  and our  conscious  intuitions”  (317),  thus  giving  pride  of  place  to  natural
science. Davidson’s approach, in Ramberg’s interpretation at least, points at something
different, an ideological view closer to what Dewey called ‘cultural naturalism.’ Looking
back at the discussions of the preceding sections – specially those in Parts II, IV and V –,
one gets  the impression that  pragmatist  philosophers  are  more akin to  the second
‘ideological’  view,  for  the ontology they commit  to  admits  such entities  as  publics,
values, habits, ends, that can hardly be tackled by natural sciences – though, of course,
they  are  not  intended  to  challenge  them  either.  This  cultural  naturalism  may  be
reassured  or  not  by a  particular  rendering  of  language,  but  its  entrenchment  in
pragmatism seems solid.
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NOTES
1. Ramón DEL CASTILLO, (2015), William James, Barcelona, RBA, 141 (my translation).
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